



Abstract. According to theological fictionalism, God has the same status as 
a fictional character in a novel or a movie. Such a claim has been defended by 
robin le Poidevin on the basis of Kendall Walton’s theory of make-believe. but 
it is not only a philosophical esoteric account of religious beliefs, it is now an 
exoteric view, sometimes accepted by “believers” themselves, and so could even 
be considered a postmodern heresy. but theological fictionalism does not work: 
faith is real assent and not make-believe; belief is different from acceptance; 
belief and faith are dispositional, but make-believe seems to presuppose an 
account of beliefs as occurrent states; we cannot anymore imagine at will than 
we can believe at will. 
INtroDuCtIoN
Theological fictionalism maintains that religious monotheistic 
commitment does not necessitate the truth of theism. According to 
this position, God could have the same ontological status as a fictional 
character in a novel or a movie. Such a character does not exist; we know 
that that character does not exist; but we think about this character and 
experience emotions (or quasi-emotions) about it and what it does. like 
the experience of fiction, religious experience could consist in a game of 
make-believe. robin le Poidevin defends such a theological fictionalism 
(without using this label) in chapter 8 (“Is God a Fiction?”) of Arguing 
for Atheism,1 partly inspired by Kendall Walton’s theory of make-believe.2 
1 robin le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism (london: routledge, 1996).
2 Kendall l. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge, mA, and london: Harvard 
university Press, 1990).
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In the first section of this paper, I will review le Poidevin’s version of 
theological fictionalism. 
but theological fictionalism is not simply a theory held by philosophers. 
It also appears to be widespread in Post-modern cultures. The assumption 
is that we do not have to accept full-blooded theological realism – that 
God exists, that He revealed himself, that Christ was resurrected, and so 
on – in order to be religious persons. Such realist claims, it is thought, 
have been definitively disproven in the post-enlightenment period, 
thanks to the human and social sciences. my second point will consist in 
inspecting this postmodernist flowering of theological fictionalism.
Fictionalism was already recognized in the Dogmatic Constitution 
of the Catholic Faith, in the text known under the name of its latin 
headwords, Dei Filius: 
even the Holy Scriptures, which had previously been declared the sole 
source and judge of Christian doctrine, began to be held no longer as 
divine, but to be ranked among the fictions of mythology.
This indicates that theological fictionalism is the outcome of a modernist 
view of faith, condemned by the Church if not refuted, but capable of 
reappearing in new and different guises. The main error of this theory is 
that it supposes a non-doxastic account of faith. Faith would not imply full 
belief, but only quasi-belief or quasi-acceptance. but there is, inescapably, 
a  strong doxastic component in faith. And unlike acceptance, belief is 
essentially realistic.
I. ComPeNDIum oF tHeoloGICAl FICtIoNAlISm
to explain the position that I  call theological fictionalism, le Poidevin 
makes use of a  debate in the philosophy of science over the status 
of theoretical entities. Within this debate, he distinguishes realism, 
instrumentalism and positivism and proposes corresponding views 
about religious matters. 
Realism. According to realism, scientific theories are to be taken at face 
value. If they appear to refer to entities in the world called “neutrons”, 
then this is what they do. Theological realism is the view that statements 
about God refer to a transcendent being. Such statements are descriptive 
and so are true or false.
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Instrumentalism. Theories, according to instrumentalism, are merely 
useful devices we use to make predictions about how things will behave. 
So, the entities referred to in theories may just be fictions. Theological 
instrumentalism says that discourse about God is purely fictional. 
but the predictive dimension is largely beside the point in theological 
instrumentalism, unless we have in mind predicting the behaviour of 
religious persons, which may be anticipated through knowing what they 
believe.
Positivism. Theories, according to positivism, are either true or false 
(and so positivism differs from instrumentalism in this respect); but 
(in contrast with realism) theories have not to be taken at face value. 
Theological positivism says that discourse apparently about God is true, 
but what it describes, in symbolic language, are truths about our moral 
and psychological lives. 
What I  call “theological fictionalism” le Poidevin calls “theological 
instrumentalism”. I think that “theological fictionalism” is a better name, 
because the notion of fiction is central to explaining how this kind of 
view works. le Poidevin relies heavily upon Walton’s theory of fiction as 
make-believe. According to Walton, 
just as a child make-believes that a group of chairs set in a line is a bus, 
or that, in chasing after a friend, he is chasing after a desperate criminal, 
armed to the teeth with a pop-gun and a water pistol, so we, in reading 
a novel, make-believe that it is reporting the truth. In doing so we, as it 
were, locate ourselves in the novel. We are there, witnessing the events. We 
may even assign ourselves a role, and imagine talking to the characters. 
It is our active participation in the fiction which explains why we become 
emotionally involved.3
le Poidevin adds: 
Walton’s solution of the paradox that we can be emotionally involved in 
something we know to be false is that we play a game of make-believe in 
which the fiction becomes reality, and part of the game is to feel something 
akin to real emotions, though they are not the genuine article.4 
3 Kendall l. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, p. 116.
4 robin le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, p. 117. 
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Theological fictionalism is thus the thesis that to engage in religious 
practice is to engage in a game of make-believe: 
We make-believe that there is a God, by reciting, in the context of the 
game, a  statement of belief. We listen to what make-believedly are 
accounts of the activities of God and his people, and we pretend to 
worship and address prayers to that God. In Walton’s terms, we locate 
ourselves in that fictional world, and in so doing we allow ourselves 
to become emotionally involved, to the extent that a  religious service 
is capable of being an intense experience. […W]e are presented with 
a series of dramatic images: an all-powerful creator, who is able to judge 
our moral worth, to forgive us or to condemn, who appears on earth in 
human form and who willingly allows himself to be put to death. What 
remains, when the game of make-believe is over, is an awareness of our 
responsibilities for ourselves and others, of the need to pursue spiritual 
goals, and so on.5 
So, according to theological fictionalism, Christians are not believers, but 
make-believers; they play with a fictional religious world as children play 
with toy cars, readers with narratives, and filmgoers with moving images. 
This can be important for their lives, the sense they have of themselves 
and of their relations with others, and their sense of morality and 
spirituality. but definitively, they do not have to claim what they believe 
to be true about someone or something, and they do not even have to 
believe anything. They are simply engaged in making sense of stories, 
characters, interpretations, and so on. 
II. tHeoloGICAl FICtIoNAlISm AS A PoStmoDerN HereSY
Theological fictionalism may seem attractive to those who want to 
preserve what they think of as the spiritual and moral content of religion 
but who do not accept an ontological commitment to a  transcendent 
being or realist claims about Christ’s resurrection, miracles, the Day of 
Judgment, and so on. Theological fictionalism says, in short, that you 
can be a Non-metaphysical Christian. God can still be viewed positively 
as the greatest single creation of the imagination. Anthony Kenny 
suggests that “set beside the idea of God, the most original inventions 
5 Ibid., p. 119. 
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of mathematicians and the most unforgettable characters in drama are 
minor products of the imagination; Hamlet and the square root of minus 
one pale into insignificance by comparison”.6 
Fictionalist theology gives sense to the claim that Christ was 
resurrected, for example, by saying that it is “true in the Gospels”, “true 
for those you accept to make sense of a certain story”, or “true in religion”. 
That Christ was resurrected would be a quasi-assertion. to quasi-assert 
that p is to express one’s acceptance of p, an attitude that is compatible 
with agnosticism and disbelief. Quasi-assertion is grounded mainly 
in non-doxastic or non-epistemic reasons, and recourse to this device 
encourages a  non-cognitivist account of religious matters. Arguably, 
quasi-assertion is grounded in pragmatic reasons, especially to provide 
comfort to oneself and to make one’s life easier to live. to accept that 
Christ was resurrected is not to believe it, as we believe for example that 
Cracow is in Poland or that the moon is not made of cheese, but it could 
be very helpful to make-believe it was so.
Theological fictionalism gained credit in Post-modern theology. by 
post-modern theology, I  mean for example Don Cuppitt’s account of 
religion (see Sea of Faith, 1984).7 He defends a  philosophical view of 
a  broader account which has insinuated itself into theology since the 
fifties. but this is not simply a philosophical affair. It now has a strong 
influence on religious people, especially in Western countries. I have no 
sociological evidence to give, but it seems to me that it is in this way that 
a  lot of Christian Westerners – especially those who have received an 
academic education – now see theological commitment. 
What has developed is a  deeply non-cognitivist and non-realistic 
account of faith. It suggests, first, that there are not religious facts to be 
discovered, such as the existence of God, or the resurrection of Christ. 
Secondly, it claims that we create the world through language, and 
historical realities through narratives. It applies to God what richard 
rorty said about dinosaurs: “once you describe something as dinosaur, 
its skin colour and sex life are causally independent of your having so 
described it. but before you describe it as a  dinosaur, or as anything 
else, there is no sense to the claim that it is ‘out there’ having properties. 
6 Anthony Kenny, Faith and Reason (New York: Columbia university Press, 1983), p. 59.
7 Don Cuppitt, The Sea of Faith (london: SCm Press, 3rd revised edition, 2003). 
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What is out there? The thing-in-itself?”8 replace dinosaur by God, 
“skin colour” and “sex life” by “all powerful” and “absolutely good”, and 
you have a corresponding non-cognitivist and non-realistic account of 
Christian religious “truths”. Theological fictionalism explain how one 
could continue to go to mass, to pray, to participate in the eucharist, 
without believing, but only make-believing, in religious matters. What 
is important finally are not the true facts, but the inward emotions and 
perhaps some of the behaviours (kindness, generosity, tolerance, etc.) 
exhibited by Christian make-believers. This corresponds also to what 
George lindbeck called the “experiential-expressivist” account of faith.9 
God is not an object of discourse, but we can make him a condition of 
discourse (and also a condition of a certain behaviour), by entering into 
a game of make-believe. And religion is just that. 
III. WHY tHeoloGICAl FICtIoNAlISm DoeS Not WorK
Walton says that what fictions make us feel are not emotions, but quasi-
emotions. He means emotions that do not suppose that we believe in 
the situation presented in the fiction. If I  am frightened by the colour 
of the sky, which promises a  very big thunderstorm, I  believe the sky 
has this colour and that such a sky indicates that there will be a very big 
thunderstorm. but if I am frightened by a monster on the screen, I do not 
believe that there is a monster. In fact, I am not afraid; I enter in a game 
of make-believe about a monster; and I am quasi-afraid, playing at fear, 
even if I am feeling (phenomenologically) what I would feel in a case of 
“true” fear. This means that quasi-emotion is a  non-doxastic emotion. 
but perhaps it could also be said that quasi-emotion corresponds to 
a quasi-belief. I play at believing that there is a monster, and that makes 
me quasi-afraid. 
Aesthetic fictionalism uncouples emotion and belief; theological 
fictionalism does something parallel and so uncouples faith and belief. 
We cannot say “I believe that p; but not p”, as G. e. moore pointed out. 
but the theological fictionalist pretends that it is possible to claim: “I have 
8 richard rorty, “taylor on truth” (in J. tully ed, Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism, 
Camridge: Cambridge university Press, p. 23). 
9 George lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine (louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1984).
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faith that p; but not p”. “to believe” is a factive verb: if I believe that p, I am 
committed to the truth of p. but if I have faith in God almighty, it would 
not be necessary for me to believe in the existence of God: to make-believe 
would be sufficient. to repeat at the mass that there is a God almighty, 
or to subscribe to the notion of God almighty Himself, would simply be 
an emotional prop in a game of make-believe. This would mean that, for 
faith, quasi-belief and quasi-emotion – the phenomenological content of 
emotion, without any doxastic component – is all that is needed for our 
psychological religious life. 
but I maintain that this will not do, for it seems for me impossible to 
“have faith in G” if you do not have faith that G exists. If S has faith in G, 
then S believes that G exists in a way that renders S’s faith in G something 
other than a  game of make-believe. That contemporary Westerners are 
tempted to replace a realistic and metaphysical account of religious faith by 
a fictional one does not imply that the epistemology of doing so is coherent.
I  propose four arguments in favour of this critique of theological 
fictionalism. 
The argument from faith as real assent
Faith is doxastic, because it supposes to believe that some propositions 
– those belonging to the Creed in the case of Christian faith – are true. 
to paraphrase John Henry Newman, a fictionalist belief in God – a belief 
about a God as a character in a narrative, and not about God as a genuine 
being – would be like “filial love without the fact of the father”. Nobody 
can place their confidence in Superman, except the inhabitants of 
metropolis, who are themselves fictional. The reader or the spectator of 
Superman adventures cannot place his confidence in Superman, because 
he does not believe Superman to exist; he may be confident on behalf of 
the inhabitants of metropolis, but this has absolutely no real importance, 
because they are themselves fictional. If Jesus Christ is a fictional character 
in a game of make-believe, we cannot place our confidence in Him; only 
characters in the bible (the apostles for example) could be confident of 
Him. And so if we understand Jesus Christ to be a fictional character, we 
do not have faith in Him.
As Newman says in the Grammar of Assent, faith is real assent, and not 
notional assent. It is not directed to words and stories, but to persons and 
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facts. So the notion of fictional assent is useless for characterizing faith in 
God. because of the doxastic component of religious faith, to have faith 
is to believe something, and to believe something means understanding 
that something to be really the case. It is not to claim that the sense of 
a certain proposition is deep and existentially moving or quasi-moving, 
but that Christ is actually the Saviour, for example. 
The argument from the difference between belief and acceptance
Theological fictionalism as it has been presented does not make difference 
between belief and acceptance. Accepting that p, unlike believing that p, 
is akin to a decision – the decision to hold a proposition. This contrasts 
strongly with the essential non-voluntariness of belief. Faith can be said to 
be voluntary, but in the sense that it is not against one’s will that a person 
believes in God. Having faith in God’s grace is not like being brainwashed. 
You can refuse to believe in God. but that does not mean that a religious 
belief is akin to a decision to believe. The doxastic component of faith 
is non-voluntary, in the sense that I  cannot decide to believe in God, 
any more than I can decide to believe that I speak Chinese or that I am 
a pumpkin, for example. one can accept a proposition without believing 
that it is true, and even while believing that it is false, hence contrary to 
evidence for its truth. but one cannot believe contrary to the evidence of 
truth. This is the main reason why simulated beliefs or quasi-beliefs are 
acceptances, and so are not beliefs at all. Simulated beliefs are no more 
beliefs than fake money is money. I wonder if the notion of make-believe 
and quasi-emotion are not, in this sense, very ambiguous, suggesting 
something like a  belief, but not exactly, and something close to an 
emotion, but not quite the same thing. 
many cases of acceptance are cases where someone has evidence for 
what he accepts; yet he has no full beliefs, but only half-beliefs. In such 
a case, and for him, a fictional stance may make good sense. If I half-
believe that p, I  can simulate that p. I  can even try to believe, like the 
libertine who asked, in a famous pensée of Pascal, to go to mass and to 
kneel down, hoping that it would make him a  genuine Christian. but 
when we try, that is not faith at all. Aquinas says:
The act of believing ... is firmly attached to one alternative and in this 
respect the believer is in the same state of mind as one who has science or 
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understanding. Yet the believer’s knowledge is not completed by a clear 
vision, and in this respect he is like one having a doubt, a suspicion, or 
an opinion.10 
This is not acceptance or half-belief, but a case of certainty without clear 
vision. There is not room here to discuss the exact nature of faith, but 
clearly theological fictionalism is deeply in error about its nature. 
The argument from the dispositional nature of belief and faith
like acceptance, simulated belief in a fictional stance supposes that we 
play with our own mental state. I know that the monster is in fact an 
artefact on the screen, but I will behave as if I believed that the monster 
was in front of me. When someone cries when looking at a movie, and is 
asked, “Why do you cry, it is only fiction?”, the answer could be that the 
very idea that something like this could happen is sorrowful. And it is not 
false that we are able to make ourselves sorrowful simply by focusing our 
mind on sorrowful ideas. So might it be in the religious case: we make 
ourselves believers by focusing on religious ideas.
Such an account of simulated belief presupposes what Henry H. Price 
called an “occurrence Analysis of belief ”.11 to believe something is to 
have a  certain occurrent mental state. In this case we would be able 
to simulate having a  certain mental state or content, without actually 
having it. Price distinguishes this account from a Dispositional Analysis 
of belief, which maintains that beliefs are not occurrent mental states 
but are rather dispositions to answer a question or to behave in a certain 
way. This means that if S believes that p, S does not have a specific mental 
content but rather has a disposition to answer “yes”, when asked if p, or 
the disposition to act according to the fact that p. And in that case, how 
would simulation be possible?
The doctrine of simulated beliefs presupposes an occurrence Analysis 
of belief. We would be able to simulate because we can simulate having 
a certain mental state or content. I will not here defend a Dispositional 
Analysis of belief, but clearly if such an analysis is correct, or is at least 
better than an occurrence Analysis, theological fictionalism is again in 
a bad position.
10 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIaIIae, 2, 1.
11 Henry H. Price, Belief (london: muirhead library of Philosophy, 1969). 
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The argument from the limitations of make-believe
We saw that we cannot believe at will, but we even cannot imagine at 
will – contrary to what is often said (on the grounds of a very common 
romantic account of imagination). I am not at all sure that imagining that 
God sent us His only son to be crucified, as a redeemer, to save us from 
our sins, would be something we could so easily do. This phenomenon 
I  call “modal imaginative resistance”. A story is told, but it makes no 
sense for us, and we don’t believe in it and cannot even make-believe in 
it. I suppose that it is exactly what happens for a lot of unbelievers. They 
do not think that the religious story is like a novel that makes sense even 
if it is a fiction. For them, it is like a novel that does not make any sense!
There is a kind of imagination by which we can consider ourselves 
as being relevantly different than we actually are. And this is of course 
often what novels and movies invite us to experiment with – to discover, 
through fictions, human possibilities: what we could be. but this does 
not always work. And it seems that fictions are telling us something 
when we find ourselves impervious to the possibilities that they offer. 
Fictions are, in short, sometimes non-starters where certain possibilities 
are concerned. Some philosophers – those who consider that we decide 
to make-believe – exaggerate our ability to make-believe. Sometimes we 
simply cannot do so, being unable to imagine that things could proceed 
as presented in a certain sort of novel or film.
Theological fictionalism must explain to us why we make-believe in 
God if we do not have to believe in him. but that we make-believe in 
Him – in His story, that His son died for us, in the resurrection of the 
flesh, and so on – is not easier to understand than the fact that people 
really believe these things. And so, theological fictionalism is not in any 
way a better epistemological position from which to explain the religious 
stance than is theological realism, and is a far worse position from which 
to raise questions of justification!
CoNCluSIoN
Theological fictionalism could perhaps pretend to be simply an account 
of the cultural dimension of Christian religion. It would certainly possible 
to visit roman churches and Gothic cathedrals with our children, and to 
say to them: “look at these wonderful works of art, my dears! Appreciate 
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all of this beauty!” The children might them ask: “but, Sir, what does 
all this mean: all these crosses, the statues, and all the rest?” – “Well, 
dear children, you must make-believe a certain story to make sense of 
all this. It is a very long story, contained in a very big book called “The 
bible”, and I  will simply tell you the main episodes. For example, it is 
said in this story that God had a son, named Jesus Christ, and that he 
was crucified to save all Humanity from death. Don’t laugh, Immanuel, 
this has a  profound meaning; and if you look at these works of art as 
if it there were a God, and a Son of God who died for us, you will be 
intensely moved by everything you see around you. Do the same as 
you do when you watch a Superman adventure on tV!” This would be 
cultural initiation. And for such an initiation, we could perhaps do with 
simulation. looking at Yoruba sculptures of twins, I  can simulate, in 
a sense, the kind of beliefs traditional Yorubas had about twins. but it 
is exactly because I do not have those beliefs that I can simulate them. If 
I do believe, I do not simulate, but share the Yorubas’ vision.
